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In this article we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Pareto optimal solutions for infinite
horizon cooperative differential games. We consider games defined by non autonomous and discounted autonomous
systems. The obtained results are used to analyze the regular indefinite linear quadratic infinite horizon differential
game. For the scalar case, we present an algorithm, with mild conditions on the control space, to find all the Pareto
optimal solutions.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we address the problem of finding the set of Pareto optimal solutions in the situation where a single
player has multiple objectives or multiple players, N players here, decide to coordinate their actions with an intent to
minimize their costs. The system or the dynamic environment where the players interact is modeled by a (set of) dif-
ferential equation(s), and we assume an open-loop information structure. Every player i may choose his action/control
trajectory, ui(.), arbitrarily from the set U i of piecewise continuous functions1. Formally, the players are assumed to
minimize the performance criteria:




gi(t,x(t),u1(t),u2(t), · · · ,uN(t))dt, (1)
where x(t) ∈ Rn is the solution of the differential equation (dynamic environment)
ẋ(t) = f (t,x(t),u1(t),u2(t), · · · ,uN(t)), x(t0) = x0 ∈ Rn. (2)
Here, ui(t) ∈ Rmi with ui(.) ∈ U i and we denote u := (u1,u2, · · · ,uN) ∈ U i×U i× ·· ·×U N = U with U being
the set of admissible controls. Let m := m1 +m2 + · · ·+mN . For the above problem to be well-defined we assume
that f (t,x,u) : R×Rn×U → Rn and gi(t,x,u) : R×Rn×U → R, i = 1,2, · · ·N, are continuous and all the partial
derivatives of f and gi w.r.t. x and u exist and are continuous. Further, we assume that the integrals involved in the
player’s objectives converge2.
Pareto optimality plays a central role in analyzing these problems. Since we are interested in the joint minimization
of the objectives of the players, the cost incurred by a single player cannot be minimized without increasing the cost
incurred by other players. So, we consider solutions which cannot be improved upon by all the players simultaneously;
the so called Pareto optimal solutions. Formally, the set of controls u∗ ∈U is Pareto optimal if the set of inequalities
Ji(u) ≤ Ji(u∗), i = 1,2, · · · ,N, with at least one of the inequalities being strict, does not allow for any solution in
u ∈ U . The corresponding point (J1(u∗),J2(u∗), · · · ,JN(u∗)) ∈ RN is called a Pareto solution. The set of all Pareto
solutions is called the Pareto frontier.
1See, e.g., [15] or [7] for a generalization.
2If the integrals do not converge there exist other notions of optimality, see [23], [5], and the analysis becomes involved.
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In this article we are interested in finding Pareto optimal solutions of the infinite horizon cooperative game problem
(1,2). Here, we do not consider formation of sub coalitions and the possibility of utility transfers during the course
of the game. We assume players make binding agreements towards cooperation at the start of the game and continue
for ever. So, by varying the controls/actions in U one obtains a set of feasible points in RN and the Pareto frontier
constitutes the set of non improvable points. Further, we do not consider the aspect of selecting a particular point on
the Pareto frontier, i.e., bargaining, and one may consult, e.g., chapter 6 of [7] for these issues. So, in cooperative
game theory terminology the problem (1,2) relates to the issue of finding costs incurred by the grand coalition in a
non transferable utility game described in strategic form, see [20] and [18].
A well known way to find Pareto optimal controls is to solve a parametrized optimal control problem [29, 16].
However, it is unclear whether all Pareto optimal solutions are obtained using this procedure, see example 4.2 [9].
The closest references we could track, towards finding Pareto solutions in differential games, are [6], [4] and [26].
The necessary conditions for Pareto solutions where cost functions are just functions of the terminal state were given
in [26] and the affiliated papers [25] and [17] . In [26] geometric properties of Pareto surfaces were used to derive
necessary conditions which are in the spirit of maximum principle. Some difference with our work are: they assume
that the admissible controls are of the feedback type and the terminal state should belong to some n−1 dimensional
surface. Recently, [9] gives necessary and sufficient conditions for Pareto optimality for finite horizon cooperative
differential games.
Almost all of the earlier works address the problem of finding Pareto solutions in the finite horizon case. In this
article we focus on infinite horizon cooperative differential games. In section 2 we present a necessary and sufficient
characterization of Pareto optimality which entails to reformulate the Pareto optimality problem as N constrained
infinite horizon optimal control problems. As a consequence, our results are in the spirit of the maximum principle. We
stress that this reformulation should not be confused with decentralization problems where each player i by choosing
actions, without coordination, from the strategy set U i to achieve a Pareto optimum. Instead, in our approach, the
constraints depend upon a Pareto solution due to the above reformulation, see lemma 2.2.
Due to the above reformulation our results are closely related to necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality
of infinite horizon optimal control problems. Infinite horizon optimal control problems arise when no natural bound
can be placed on the time horizon, for example while modeling capital accumulation processes (economic growth)
and in biological sciences. In his seminal work on the theory of saving, Ramsey [21] used a dynamic optimization
model defined on an unbounded time horizon, see [1] for more details. As the objectives can grow unbounded dif-
ferent notions of optimality have been introduced, see [5, 23] more details on the analysis. The necessary conditions
for optimality given by the maximum principle are incomplete as transversality conditions are not clearly specified.
As a result one obtains a large number of extremal trajectories. A natural extension of finite horizon transversality
conditions, in general, is not possible, see [12]. Only by imposing certain restrictions on the system such an extension
can be made, see [19], [23], [22] and more recently [2] and [27].
In section 3 we show, by making a particular assumption on the Lagrange multipliers, that the necessary conditions
for Pareto optimality are same as the necessary conditions for optimality of a weighted sum optimal control problem.
Further, we observe that an extension of finite horizon transversaility conditions is a weak sufficient condition to sat-
isfy this assumption. For discounted autonomous systems, [19] derives necessary conditions for free endpoint optimal
control problems. We extend these results for the constrained problems (due to the above reformulation) and derive
weak sufficient conditions for this assumption to hold true. In section 4 we derive sufficient conditions for Pareto opti-
mality in the spirit of Arrow’s sufficiency results in optimal control. In section 5 we consider regular indefinite infinite
planning horizon linear quadratic differential games where the cost involved for the state variable has an arbitrary sign
and the use of every control is quadratically penalized. We observe that if the dynamic system is controllable then this
assumption holds true naturally. The linear quadratic case was recently solved for both a finite and infinite planning
horizon in [8] assuming that the problem is a convex function of the control variables and the initial state is arbitrary.
In this article we concentrate on the general case and where the initial state is fixed and the planning horizon is infinite.
We provide some examples to illustrate subtleties and open issues. For the scalar case, by imposing a restriction on
the control space, we show that all Pareto optimal solutions can be obtained using the weighting method and provide
an algorithm to compute all the Pareto solutions.
Notation: We use the following notation. Let N = {1,2, · · · ,N} denote the grand coalition and let N\{i} denote
the coalition of all players excluding player i. Let PN denote the N dimensional unit simplex. RN+ denotes a cone
consisting of N dimensional vectors with non negative entries. 1N denotes a vector in RN with all its entries equal
to 1. y′ represents the transpose of the vector y ∈ RN . |x| represents the absolute value of x ∈ R. ||y|| represents
the Euclidean norm of the vector y ∈ RN . |y|i represents the absolute value of the ith entry of the vector y. |A|(m,n)
represents the absolute value of entry (m,n) of the matrix A. A > 0 denotes matrix A is strictly positive definite. fx(.)
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represents the partial derivative of the function f (.) w.r.t x. Φ fx(t,0) = e
∫ t
0 fx(x,u)dt represents the state transition matrix
associated with the linear autonomous linear ordinary differential equation ẋ = fx(x,u)x, x(0) = x0.
−→
ω ∈ RN+ denotes
the vector whose entries ωi are the weights assigned to the cost function of each player. We define the weighted sum
function G(.) as G(−→ω , t,x(t),u(t)) = ∑i∈N ωigi(t,x(t),u(t)). A matrix Mω represents ∑i∈N ωiMi where
−→
ω represents
the weight vector. sp{v1,v2, · · · ,vk} represents the subspace spanned by the vectors v1,v2, · · · ,vk.
2 Pareto Optimality
In this section we state conditions to characterize Pareto optimal controls. Lemma 2.1, given below, states that every
control minimizing a weighted sum of the cost function of all players (where all weights are strictly positive) is Pareto
optimal. So, varying the positive weights over the unit simplex one obtains, in principle, different Pareto optimal
controls. A proof of the lemma can be found in [9, 16].
Lemma 2.1. Let αi ∈ (0,1), with ∑Ni=0 αi = 1. Assume u∗ ∈U is such that









Then u∗ is Pareto optimal.
The above lemma implies that minimizing the weighted sum is an easy way to find Pareto optimal controls. Being
a sufficient condition it is, however, unclear whether we obtain all Pareto optimal controls in this way. Lemma 2.2
mentioned below gives both a necessary and sufficient characterization of Pareto solutions. It states that every player’s
Pareto optimal solutions can be obtained as the solution of a constrained optimization problem. The proof is along the
lines of the finite dimensional case considered in chapter 22 of [24].
Lemma 2.2. u∗ ∈U is Pareto optimal if and only if for all i, u∗(.) minimizes Ji(u) on the constrained set
Ui =
{
u|J j(u)≤ J j(u∗), j = 1, · · · ,N, j 6= i
}
, for i = 1, · · · ,N. (4)
Proof. ⇒ Suppose u∗ is Pareto optimal. Then u∗ ∈ Uk, ∀k, so Uk 6= /0. Now, if u∗ does not minimize Jk(u) on the
constraint set Uk for some k, then there exists a u such that J j(u) ≤ J j(u∗) for all j 6= k and Jk(u) < Jk(u∗). This
contradicts the Pareto optimality of u∗.
⇐ Suppose u∗ minimizes each Jk(u) on Uk. If û does not provide a Pareto optimum, then there exists a u(.) ∈ U
and an index k such that Ji(u) 6= Ji(u∗) for all i and Jk(u)< Jk(u∗). This contradicts the minimality of u∗ for Jk(u) on
Uk.
We observe that for a fixed player the constraint set Ui defined in (4) depends on the entries of the Pareto optimal
solution that represents the loss of the other players. Therefore this result mainly serves theoretical purposes, as we
will see, e.g., in the proof of theorem 3.1 and theorem 3.3. Using the above lemma, we next argue that Pareto optimal
controls satisfy the dynamic programming principle.
Corollary 2.1. If u∗ ∈U is a Pareto optimal control for x(0) = x0 in (1,2), then for any τ > 0, u∗ ([τ,∞)) is a Pareto
optimal control for x(τ) = x∗(τ) in (1,2). Here, x∗(τ) = x(t,0,u∗([0,τ])) is the value of the state at τ generated by
u∗([0,τ]).




∣∣J j(x(τ),u)≤ J j(x(τ),u∗ ([τ,∞)) , j = 1, · · · ,N, j 6= i} .
Consider a control u ∈ Ui(τ) and let ue ([0,∞)) be a control defined on [0,∞) such that ue ([0,τ)) = u∗ ([0,τ)) and
ue ([τ,∞)) = u, then x(τ,0,ue([0,τ)) = x∗(τ). Further,




























g j(t,x∗(t),u∗(t)) dt = J j(0,x0,u∗).
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The above inequality holds for all j = 1, · · · ,N, j 6= i. Clearly, ue ([0,∞)) ∈ Ui(0) i.e., every element u ∈ Ui(τ) can
be viewed as an element ue ∈Ui(0) restricted to the time interval [τ,∞). From the dynamic programming principle it
follows directly that u∗ ([τ,∞)) has to minimize Ji(τ,x∗(τ),u) on Ui(τ).
Another result that follows directly from lemma 2.2 is that if the argument at which some player’s cost is minimized
is unique, then this control is Pareto optimal too (see corollary 2.5 in [9] for the proof).
Corollary 2.2. Assume J1(u) has a minimum which is uniquely attained at u∗. Then
(




We give the following result from lemma 2.2. Since, Pareto optimality is preserved for every strictly monotonic
transformation of the cost functions, if the player’s costs are modified as J̃i(u) = Ji(u)− c, c ∈ R, ∀i ∈ N, then we
have the following corollary.
Corollary 2.3. The set of Pareto optimal strategies for the games with player’s objectives as Ji(u) and J̃i(u), i ∈ N, is
the same.
3 Necessary Conditions for the General Case
In this section, using lemma 2.2 we derive necessary conditions of Pareto optimality for the problem (2,1) in a general
setting. Before proceeding in this direction we give the following notation for the N person infinite horizon cooperative
differential game:






sub. to ẋ(t) = f (t,x(t),u(t)), x(0) = x0.
Let u∗ be a Pareto optimal strategy for the problem (P) and x∗ be the trajectory generated by u∗. Using lemma 2.2, (P)







sub. to ẋ(t) = f (t,x(t),u(t)), x(0) = x0.
The control space Ui in (Pi) is constrained and depends on the Pareto optimal solution of players j ∈ N\{i}. Introduc-




gi(t,x(t),u(t))dt, x̃ij(0) = 0,




∣∣ ˙̃xij(t) = g j(t,x(t),u(t)), x̃ij(0) = 0, limt→∞ x̃ij(t)≤ x̃i∗j = ∫ ∞0 gi(t,x∗(t),u∗(t))dt, ∀ j ∈ N\{i}
}
.







sub. to ẋ(t) = f (t,x(t),u(t)), x(0) = x0
˙̃xij(t) = g j(t,x(t),u(t)), x̃
i




j , ∀ j ∈ N\{i}.
Collecting the above and from lemma 2.2, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. u∗ is a Pareto optimal control for the cooperative game problem (P)⇔ u∗ is an optimal control for
the problems (Pi), i ∈ N.
The optimal control problems (Pi) have mixed end point constraints, i.e., limt→∞ x(t) is free and limt→∞ x̃ij(t), j ∈
N\{i} are constrained. Let Hi denote the Hamiltonian associated with the problem (Pi) and be defined as (with abuse
of notation) Hi := λ 0i gi +λ
′
i f +∑ j∈N\{i} µ
i
jg j. From proposition 3.1, by applying Pontryagin maximum principle for
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(Pi) one can obtain necessary conditions for Pareto optimality for (P). These necessary conditions give a set of extremal
trajectories and the associated transversality conditions allow one to single out the optimal one. If the game problem
(P) is finite horizon type, then the transversality conditions associated with the problem (Pi) are λi(T ) = 0, 0 < T < ∞
and µ ij ≥ 0 for j ∈ N\{i}, i ∈ N and the maximum principle holds in normal form i.e., λ 0i = 1, i ∈ N (refer to
proposition 3.16, [11]). Using these ideas it was shown in [9] that necessary conditions for Pareto optimality for (P)
are same as the necessary conditions for optimality of a weighted sum optimal control problem. The main result there
hinges upon the transversality conditions and normality of the problems (Pi). Unfortunately, for the infinite horizon
case the necessary conditions for optimality of the problems (Pi) are incomplete (see pg. 234, theorem 12 of [23]).
The above finite horizon transversality conditions generally do not naturally carry over to the infinite horizon case.
Refer to [12, 11, 19, 23, 2] for counterexamples to illustrate this behavior.
We will see in the following discussion that µ ij(t) = µ
i





µ i1, · · · ,µ ii−1,λ 0i , µ ii+1, · · · ,µ iN
)′
, i ∈ N. In the theorem 3.1 below, by making an assumption on
−→
λ i we show, using
proposition 3.1, that necessary conditions of Pareto optimality of (P) are the same as the necessary conditions for
optimality of a weighted sum optimal control problem.
Assumption 1. For each problem (Pi), the Lagrange multipliers associated with the objective function and the states
(x̃ij(t)) are non negative with at least one of them strictly positive, i.e.,
−→
λ i ∈ RN+\{0}.
Theorem 3.1. If (J1(u∗),J2(u∗), · · · ,JN(u∗)) is a Pareto candidate for problem (P) and assumption (1) holds, then
there exists an−→α ∈PN , a co-state function λ (t) : [0,∞)→Rn such that with H(−→α , t,x(t),u(t),λ (t))= λ ′(t) f (t,x(t),u(t))+
G(−→α , t,x(t),u(t)), the following conditions are satisfied.
H(−→α , t,x∗(t),u∗(t),λ (t))≤H(−→α , t,x∗(t),u(t),λ (t)) (5a)
H0(−→α , t,x∗(t),λ (t)) =min
u(t)
H(−→α , t,x∗(t),u(t),λ (t))
λ̇ (t) =−H0x (
−→
α , t,x∗(t),λ (t)) (5b)
ẋ∗(t) = H0
λ
(−→α , t,x∗(t),λ (t)) s.t x∗(0) = x0 (5c)(−→
α ,λ (t)
)
6=0, ∀t ∈ [0,∞), −→α ∈PN . (5d)
Proof. From proposition 3.1, if u∗ is Pareto optimal for (P) then the pair (x∗,u∗) is optimal for the problem (Pi). We
define the Hamiltonian associated with (Pi) as:







So, from Pontryagin’s maximum principle there exist a constant λ 0i and co-state functions (continuous and piecewise
continuously differentiable) λi(t) ∈ Rn and µ ij(t) ∈ R, j ∈ SiN such that:
(λ 0i ,λi(t),µ
i
j(t)) 6= (0,0,0), j ∈ N\{i}, t ∈ [0,∞) (7a)
Hi(t,x∗(t),u∗(t),λ (t)) ≤ Hi(t,x∗(t),u(t),λ (t)) (7b)
H0i (t,x(t),λ (t)) = min
u(t)
Hi(t,x(t),u(t),λ (t))




j(t) = −H0i x̃ij(t,x
∗(t),λ (t)). (7d)




j (constants) and the Hamiltonian can
be written as Hi(t,x(t),u(t),λ (t)) = λ ′i (t) f (t,x(t),u(t))+G(
−→
λ i, t,x(t),u(t)). The first order conditions are:
λ
′
i (t) f (t,x
∗(t),u∗(t))+G(
−→
λ i, t,x∗(t),u∗(t)) ≤ λ ′i (t) f (t,x∗(t),u(t))+G(
−→
λ i, t,x∗(t),u(t)) (8)
λ̇i(t) =− f ′x(t,x∗(t),u∗(t))λi(t)−Gx(
−→
λ i, t,x∗(t),u∗(t)). (9)































λ i, t,x∗(t),u∗(t)). (11)
Let us introduce d := ∑i∈N
(




. By assumption 1 we have d > 0. We define λ (t) := 1d ∑i∈N λi(t),
αi := 1d
(




, i∈N and a vector−→α := (α1, · · · ,αN)′. Notice that−→α ∈PN by assumption (1). Dividing
the equation (10) by d we have:
λ
′(t) f (t,x∗(t),u∗(t))+G(−→α , t,x∗(t),u∗(t))) ≤ λ ′(t) f (t,x∗(t),u(t))+G(−→α , t,x∗(t),u(t)) (12)
λ̇ (t) =− f ′x(t,x∗(t),u∗(t))λ (t)−Gx(
−→
α , t,x∗(t),u∗(t)). (13)
Next we define the modified Hamiltonian as
H(−→α , t,x(t),u(t),λ (t)) = λ ′(t) f (t,x(t),u(t))+G(−→α , t,x(t),u(t)).
The above necessary conditions for u∗ to be Pareto optimal control can be rewritten as (5).
Remark 1. The necessary conditions given by (5) are closely related to the minimization of ∑i∈N αiJi subject to (2),
i.e., the weighted sum optimal control problem. There are, however, some subtle differences. When the weighted sum
optimal control problem admits maximum principle in normal form then one obtains necessary conditions as (5).
A natural extension of finite horizon transversality conditions to the infinite horizon case for the problem (Pi), i ∈ N
leads to λ 0i = 1 and µ
i
j ≥ 0 for i ∈ N, and as result guarantees assumption 1. For the analysis that follows from now
onwards we focus on weak sufficient conditions that allow such an extension. Towards that end, we first consider non-
autonomous systems. In general, such an extension is achieved by imposing restrictions on the system parameters,





0 gi(t,x(t),u(t))dt >−∞, i∈N and there exist non-negative numbers a, b and c with c>Nb
such that the following conditions are satisfied for t ≥ 0 and all x(t):
(|gix(t,x(t),u(t)|)m ≤ ae
−ct , m = 1, · · · ,N, ∀i ∈ N (14a)
(| fx(t,x(t),u(t)|)(l,m) ≤ b, l = 1, · · · ,N, m = 1, · · · ,N. (14b)
Then assumption 1 is satisfied. Consequently, for every Pareto solution the necessary conditions given by (5) hold true
and in addition limt→∞ λ (t) = 0 is satisfied.
Proof. If conditions (14) hold true, then by theorem 3.16 of [23], the finite horizon transversality conditions do extend
to the infinite horizon case. As a result, λ 0i = 1, µ
j
i ≥ 0, ∀ j ∈ N\{i} and limt→∞ λi(t) = 0 are satisfied for the
constrained optimal control problem (Pi) we have
−→
λ i ∈RN+\{0}. Clearly assumption (1) is satisfied. So, the necessary
conditions given by (5) hold true and in addition limt→∞ λ (t) = 0.
The following example demonstrates the application of theorem 3.1 and corollary 3.1.











sub. to ẋ(t) =
ρ
2
x(t)+u1(t)−u2(t), x(0) = 0, t ∈ [0,∞)
u ∈U , s.t U =
{
u(.)
∣∣ ∀t ≥ 0, u(t) ∈ E ⊂ Rm, E is a closed and bounded set} (15)
Taking the transformations x̃(t) = e−ρt/2x(t) and ũi(t) = e−ρt/2ui(t), we transform the game (P) as a new game (P̃)
given by:










sub. to ˙̃x(t) = ũ1(t)− ũ2(t), x̃(0) = 0, t ∈ [0,∞) (16)
ũi(t) = e−ρt/2ui(t), i = 1,2. (17)
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We have Ji(x0,u1,u2) = Ji(x0, ũ1, ũ2), i = 1,2. The player’s objectives are simplified as:




(ũ1(t)− ũ2(t))dt = lim
t→∞
x̃(t)













By construction, |u(t)|< c for some c > 0, ∀ t ≥ 0 and limt→∞ x̃(t)≤ 2c/ρ . We notice that J2 =− 13 J
3
1 for all (u1,u2)
and choosing different values for the control functions ui(.), every point in the (J1,J2) plane satisfying J2 =− 13 J
3
1 can
be attained. Moreover, every point on this curve is Pareto optimal. This conclusion can be derived from the application
of theorem 3.1 and corollary 3.1 too. With straightforward calculations we can show that for (P̃), | fx̃(.)|= 0, |g1 x̃(.)|=
0, |g2 x̃(.)| ≤ 2|x̃(t)||ũ1(t)− ũ2(t)| ≤ 4c2/ρ . The growth conditions mentioned in corollary 3.1 hold true for the game
problem (P̃). Then from theorem 3.1 there exists a co-state function λ̃ (t), with Hamiltonian defined as










= 0 for all t ∈ [0,∞). (18)
As the growth conditions are satisfied we have limt→∞ λ̃ (t) = 0. The adjoint variable λ̃ (t) satisfies (by differentiating
(18))
˙̃
λ (t) = 2(1−α)x̃∗(t)(ũ2(t)− ũ1(t)), ∀t ∈ [0,∞) lim
t→∞
λ̃ (t) = 0.
We see that the necessary condition (7b) also results in the same differential equation for λ̃ (t), ∀ t ∈ [0,∞). Using
(18) we can conclude that for arbitrary choices of u1(.) and u2(.), theorem 3.1 holds true by choosing α such that
limt→∞ x̃∗
2
(t) = α1−α . So, all the controls u1(.) and u2(.) are candidates for Pareto solutions (as they satisfy the
necessary conditions). To show that the candidates are indeed Pareto optimal we have to show that the necessary
conditions are sufficient too. This aspect is treated in example 3.
3.1 Discounted Autonomous systems
The growth conditions given in corollary 3.1 ensure that assumption 1 is satisfied. However, the conditions (14)
are quite strict. In this subsection we analyze games defined by autonomous systems with exponentially discounted
player’s costs and for this class of problems assumption 1 is guaranteed under mild conditions. The discount factor ρ is
assumed to be strictly positive. We represent the game problem as (Pρ) and the related optimal control problem as (Pρi ).
For discounted autonomous systems, Mitchel [19] gives necessary conditions for optimality for free endpoint infinite
horizon optimal control problems. However, in the present case the problems (Pρi ) are constrained with constraints
taking a special structure. In the following discussion, owing to this special structure, we show that the conditions given
by Mitchel [19] are sufficient to guarantee assumption 1. As a result, the necessary conditions for Pareto optimality of
(Pρ ) are the same as the necessary conditions for optimality of a weighted sum optimal control problem.
As a first step, we derive the necessary conditions for optimality for the mixed endpoint constrained optimal control
problem (Pρi ) (in similar lines of [19]
3). If u∗ is a Pareto optimal strategy for the game problem (Pρ ), then from






sub. to ẋ(t) = f (x(t),u(t)), x(0) = x0, u ∈U




j , ∀ j ∈ N\{i}.





e−ρtgi (x∗(t− z+T ),u∗(t− z+T ))dt. (19)
3Notice, the necessary conditions given by Mitchel [19] considers only the free end point optimal control problem.
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To derive the necessary conditions for optimality of u∗, we first consider the following truncated and augmented
problem (PρiT ) (associated with the problem (P
ρ






sub. to Ẏ (t) = v(t) f (Y (t),U(t)), Y (0) = Y0, Y (T ) = x∗(T ), U ∈U
˙̃Y ij(t) = v(t)e
−ρz(t)g j(Y (t),U(t)), Ỹ ij(0) = 0, Ỹ
i
j(T )+h j(z(T )−T )≤ x̃i
∗
j , ∀ j ∈ N\{i} (20)





Remark 2. Notice that the above problem is a mixed end point constrained finite horizon problem, i.e., X(T ) is fixed
and Y ij(T ) is constrained. Further, (20) captures the constraint set Ui defined in lemma 2.2.
The following lemma, which is useful in theorem 3.2, relates the optimal solution of (Pρi ) to the optimal solution (P
ρ
iT ).
The proof of lemma 3.1 is given in the appendix. We notice that the special structure of constraints given by (20) plays
a role in arriving at this conclusion.
Lemma 3.1. If (x∗(t),u∗(t)) is an optimal admissible pair for the problem (Pρi ) then (x
∗(t), t,u∗(t),1), t ∈ [0, T ], is
an optimal admissible pair for the problem (PρiT ).
Using the above lemma, we give necessary conditions for optimality of problem (Pρi ) in the following theorem (see
appendix for the proof).




is an optimal pair for the problem (Pρi ) then there exist
−→
λ i ∈ RN+, l0i ∈ Rn
and continuous functions λi(t) ∈ Rn and γi(t) ∈ R respectively such that(−→
λ i,λi(t),γi(t)
)
6= (0,0,0), ∀t ≥ 0,
∥∥∥(−→λ i,λi(0))∥∥∥= 1 (21a)
λ̇i(t) =−e−ρtGx(
−→
λ i,x∗(t),u∗(t))− f ′x(x∗(t),u∗(t))λi(t), λi(0) = l0i (21b)




γi(t) = 0 (21c)
H(
−→






λ i, t,x∗(t),u∗(t),λ (t))≤ H(
−→
λ i, t,x∗(t),u(t),λ (t)) ∀u(t) (21d)
H(
−→
λ i, t,x∗(t),u∗(t),λ (t)) =−γi(t). (21e)
Remark 3. Though the approach in lemma 3.1 and theorem 3.2 is similar to the one given in [19], the main differences
lie in the problem formulation. In [19], the necessary conditions are obtained for the free endpoint unconstrained
infinite horizon optimal control problem. However, the game problem (Pρ ), due to proposition 3.1, leads to N mixed
endpoint constrained optimal control problems (Pρi ).
From theorem 3.2, if u∗ is optimal for the problem (Pi) then there exists a
−→
λ i ∈RN+ such that the conditions (21) hold
true. These necessary conditions are closely related to the minimization of a weighted sum optimal control problem
with the weight vector
−→
λ i. This observation is evident in the non-autonomous case as well, see (8) and (9). Due to
the special structure of the constraint set Ui, the term G(
−→
λ i,x∗(t),u∗(t)), weighted instantaneous undiscounted cost
of the players, appears in the necessary conditions for optimality of all the problems (Pρi ), i ∈ N. Now, from (21a)
and (21c) if limt→∞ λi(t) = 0 then assumption 1 holds true. As the scrap value associated with problem (P
ρ
i ) is zero,
limt→∞ λi(t) = 0 is the natural transversality condition. In the discussion that follows we give two possible ways,
in corollary 3.2 and corollary 3.3, to ensure limt→∞ λi(t) = 0. For autonomous systems [19] gives assumptions under
which the natural transversality condition holds for the free endpoint case with maximization criterion. We show in the
corollary 3.2 that these conditions, formulated as assumption 2 below, also suffice to conclude that this transversality
condition holds for the problem (Pρi ). The proof, given in the appendix, is along the same lines of [19], and requires
the following assumption.
Assumption 2. gi(x(t),u(t)), ∀i ∈ N is non positive and there exists a neighborhood V of 0 ∈ Rn which is contained
in the set of possible velocities f (x∗(t),u(t)) for all u ∈U if t→ ∞.
Corollary 3.2. Let assumption 2 hold true. Then, an optimal solution for the problem (Pρi ) satisfies in addition to the
conditions (21), the following transversality condition: limt→∞ λi(t) = 0.
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Remark 4. a) The nonpositivity assumption 2 can be relaxed. If the instantaneous undiscounted costs of play-
ers gi(x(t),u(t)), i ∈ N are bounded above for all pairs (x(t),u(t)), t ∈ [0,∞) then by assigning a new cost
g̃i(x(t),u(t))= gi(x(t),u(t))−M with M =maxi∈N supt∈[0,∞) gi(x(t),u(t)) leaves g̃(x(t),u(t)) nonpositive. Now,
by defining a new game (P̃ρ ) with g̃(.) as the instantaneous undiscounted costs for player i we observe that
Pareto optimal controls (if they exist) of (Pρ ) and (P̃ρ ) coincide. We will use this idea in example 2 to find
Pareto optimal controls.
b) Notice that the second condition in assumption 2 is identical to the notion of state reachability when the state
dynamics is described by a linear constant coefficient differential equation.
The conditions given in assumption 2 are mild but they are difficult to verify except for special cases, see remark 4(b)
and example 2. Another possibility is to seek for (growth) conditions so as to obtain a bound on ||λi(t)||. Recently,
[23, 2] discuss such conditions for a class of free end point optimal control problems. In the following corollary 3.3,
which is in the same spirit as the above works, we give (growth) conditions for the problem (Pρi ). Towards that end,
we make the following assumption. The proof of the corollary is provided in the appendix.
Assumption 3. a) There exist a s≥ 0 and an r ≥ 0 such that
||gix(x(t),u(t))|| ≤ s(1+ ||x(t)||r) for all x(t) ∈ Rn,u ∈U and i ∈ N.
b) There exist nonnegative constants c1, c2, c3 and λ ∈ R, such that for every admissible pair (x(t),u(t)), one has
||x(t)|| ≤ c1 + c2eλ t for all t ≥ 0,
||Φ fx(t,0)|| ≤ c3eλ t for all t ≥ 0.
c) For every admissible pair (x(t),u(t)) the eigenvalues of fx(x(t),u(t)) are strictly positive.
Corollary 3.3. Let assumption 3 hold true. Then, an optimal solution for problem (Pρi ) satisfies in addition to the
conditions (21), the following transversality condition limt→∞ λi(t) = 0 if ρ > (1+ r)λ .
Remark 5. a) In the above corollary, by selecting a high discount factor, i.e., dominated discounting, the natural
transversality condition is obtained. When the state evolution dynamics is linear and player’s objectives are
convex in the control variable, the growth conditions (a) and (b) given in assumption 3 are similar to those
obtained in [2] and [3].
b) In [2], the free endpoint infinite horizon optimal control problem is approximated with a series of free endpoint
finite horizon problems whereas in the current approach (Pρi ) is approximated with fixed endpoint problems. As
a result, an additional condition (c) appears in the assumption 3, see the proof in appendix for more details.
To summarize, Corollaries 3.2 and 3.3 are sufficient conditions to ensure that assumption 1 holds true. Now, collecting
the above results we proceed to the main result of the subsection.
Theorem 3.3. Let assumption 2 or 3 hold true. If (J1(u∗),J2(u∗), · · · ,JN(u∗)) is a Pareto optimal solution for problem
(P) then there exists an −→α ∈PN and a co-state function λ (t) : [0,∞)→ Rn such that the following conditions are
satisfied.
H(−→α , t,x(t),u(t),λ (t)) = λ ′(t) f (t,x(t),u(t))+ e−ρtG(−→α ,x(t),u(t)) (22a)
H(−→α , t,x∗(t),u∗(t),λ (t))≤ H(−→α , t,x∗(t),u(t),λ (t)), ∀u(t) (22b)
H0(−→α , t,x∗(t),λ (t)) = min
u(t)∈U
H(−→α , t,x∗(t),u(t),λ (t))
λ̇ (t) =−H0x (
−→
α , t,x∗(t),λ (t)), λ (0) = l0 ∈ Rn, lim
t→∞
λ (t) = 0 (22c)
ẋ∗(t) = H0
λ
(−→α , t,x∗(t),λ (t)), x∗(0) = x0 (22d)
γ̇(t) = ρ G(−→α ,x∗(t),u∗(t)), lim
t→∞
γ(t) = 0 (22e)
H0(−→α , t,x∗(t),λ (t)) =−γ(t) (22f)(−→
α ,γ(t),λ (t)
)
6= 0, ∀t ∈ [0,∞), −→α ∈PN . (22g)
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Proof. If assumption 2 or 3 holds true then for each problem (Pρi )
−→
λ i ∈ RN+\{0} and limt→∞ λi(t) = 0. We define
d = ∑i∈N
−→








, i ∈ N and a vector −→α = (α1, · · · ,αN)′. We notice that −→α ∈PN . Taking
the summation of equation (21b) for all i ∈ N and defining λ (t) = 1d ∑i∈N λi(t) we observe that conditions (22b) and
(37) are satisfied. Taking the summation of equation (21c) for all i ∈ N and defining γ(t) = 1d ∑i∈N γi(t), the conditions
(22e) and (22f) are satisfied. Since, −→α ∈PN and limt→∞ λ (t) = 0 we observe that (22g) is satisfied.
Next, we consider an example from [14] to illustrate usage of assumption 2 and theorem 3.3.
Example 2. Consider a fishery game with two players. The evolution of the stock of fish, in a particular area, is
governed by the differential equation
ẋ(t) = ax(t)−bx(t) lnx(t)−u1(t)−u2(t), x(0) = x0 ≥ 2 (23)
where x(t) refers to the stock of fish, and a > 0, b > 0. It is assumed that x(t)≥ 2, t ∈ [0,∞). In (23), the stock of fish
x(t) depends upon ax(t) births, bx(t) lnx(t) deaths and the fishing efforts of player i, ui(t) = wi(t)x(t), at each point in






We assume 0 < ε ≤ wi(t)< ∞ for the utility to be well defined. By taking the transformation y(t) = lnx(t) the system
(23) is modified as:
ẏ(t) = a−by(t)−w1(t)−w2(t), y(0) = lnx(0), (24)





e−ρt (y(t)+ lnwi(t)) dt. (25)
We notice that the instantaneous undiscounted reward is bounded below. By controllability of the system (24) and
remark 4.a we notice that assumption 2 is satisfied. So all Pareto candidates can be obtained by solving the necessary








e−ρt (y(t)+α lnw1(t)+(1−α) lnw2(t))dt
}
,
subject to (24). Defining the Hamiltonian as
H(α, t,y,w1,w2,λ ) = λ (a−by(t)−w1(t)−w2(t))− e−ρt (y(t)+α lnw1(t)+(1−α) lnw2(t)) .
Taking Hwi = 0, i = 1,2 gives w1(t) =− αλ (t)e
−ρt and w2(t) =− 1−αλ (t) e
−ρt . The adjoint variable is governed by
λ̇ (t) = bλ (t)+ e−ρt , lim
t→∞
λ (t) = 0,
and the solution is given as λ (t) = − e−ρt
ρ+b . The candidates for Pareto optimal strategies in open loop form are given
by:
u∗1(t) = α(ρ +b)e
m(t,x0),
u∗2(t) = (1−α)(ρ +b)em(t,x0),






. The candidates for Pareto solutions are given as
J∗1 (x0,u1,u2) =














4 Sufficient Conditions for Pareto Optimality
It is well known [10] that if the action spaces as well as the players objective functions are convex then minimization
of the weighted sum of the objectives results in all Pareto solutions. We give the following theorem from [7].
Theorem 4.1. If U is convex and Ji(u) is convex for all i = 1,2, · · · ,N then for all Pareto optimal u∗ there exist−→
α ∈PN , such that u∗ ∈ argminu∈U ∑Ni=1 αiJi(u).
Recently in [8], this property was used to obtain both necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Pareto
optimal solutions for regular convex linear quadratic differential games. In general it is a difficult task to check if the
players objectives are convex functions of initial state and controls. However, under some conditions the solutions
of (29) result in Pareto optimal strategies. In this section we derive sufficient conditions for a strategy to be Pareto
optimal. The sufficient conditions given in the theorem below are inspired by Arrow’s sufficient conditions [23] in
optimal control. Further, these sufficient conditions are given for non-autonomous systems and they hold true for
discounted autonomous systems as well.
Theorem 4.2. Assume that there exists −→α ∈PN and a co-state function λ (t) : [0,∞)→Rn satisfying (37). Introduce
the Hamiltonian H(t,−→α ,x(t),u(t),λ (t)) := f (t,x(t), u(t))+G(−→α , t,x(t),u(t)). Assume that the Hamiltonian has a
minimum w.r.t u(t) for all x(t), denoted by
H0(−→α , t,x(t),λ (t)) = min
u(t)
H(−→α , t,x(t),u(t),λ (t)).
If H0(−→α , t,x(t),λ (t)) is convex in x(t) and liminft→∞ λ ′(t) (x∗(t)− x(t))≥ 0, then u∗(t) is Pareto optimal.
Proof. From the convexity of H0(−→α , t,x(t),λ (t)) we have:
H0(−→α , t,x(t),λ (t))−H0(−→α , t,x∗(t),λ (t))≥ H0x (
−→
α , t,x∗(t),λ (t))(x(t)− x∗(t))
Since, H(−→α , t,x(t),u(t),λ (t))≥ H0(−→α , t,x(t),λ (t)) and H(−→α , t,x∗(t),u∗(t),λ (t)) = H0(−→α , t,x∗(t),λ (t)) we have:
H(−→α , t,x(t),u(t),λ (t))−H(−→α , t,x∗(t),u∗(t),λ (t))≥ H0x
′
(−→α , t,x∗(t),λ (t))(x(t)− x∗(t))
=−λ̇ ′(t)(x(t)− x∗(t)) (by (37)).
Using the definition of Hamiltonian the above inequality can be written as:
λ
′(t)( f (t,x(t),u(t)− f (t,x∗(t),u∗(t)))+G(−→α , t,x(t),u(t))−G(−→α , t,x∗(t),u∗(t))≥−λ̇ ′(t)(x(t)− x∗(t)) ,
(
G(−→α , t,x(t),u(t))−G(−→α , t,x∗(t),u∗(t))
)









Taking the integrals on both sides we have∫ T
0
(









As x∗(0) = x(0) = x0 and λ (0) is bounded the above inequality is given as:∫ T
0
(





′(T )(x∗(T )− x(T ))
)
.








Clearly, by lemma 2.1 u∗ is Pareto optimal.
Example 3. (sufficient conditions): We illustrate theorem 4.2 by considering example 1 again. First, we notice
that H0(t, x̃∗, λ̃ ) = 0 so H0(t, x̃∗, λ̃ ) is convex in x̃(t). Next, limt→∞ x̃(t) exists and is finite and limt→∞ λ̃ (t) = 0, so
liminft→∞ λ̃ (t) (x̃∗(t)− x̃(t)) = 0. So, by theorem 4.2 every control (u1,u2) is Pareto optimal.
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Example 4. (sufficient conditions): For example 2 the candidates for Pareto solutions are given by (26). If the model
in example 2 satisfies the sufficient conditions mentioned in theorem 4.2, then all Pareto solutions are indeed given by
(26). The minimized Hamiltonian is given by:












Clearly, H0(t,y(t),λ (t)) is convex (linear here) in y(t). Since wi(t), i= 1,2, is bounded we have |y(t)| ≤ (c1+c2e−bt).
Further, λ (t) = − e−ρt
ρ+b , thus we have liminft→∞ λ (t)(y
∗(t)− y(t)) = 0. The fishery model satisfies the sufficient
conditions as given by theorem 4.2. So, all the candidates given by (26) are Pareto solutions.
5 Linear Quadratic Case
In this section we consider the discounted infinite planning horizon linear quadratic cooperative differential game
(denoted as (PLQ)). Player i ∈ N may choose his control trajectory, ui(.) from the set of admissible controls U where
the specific choice of control space will be clarified below. The problem is to determine the set of Pareto solutions for









sub. to ẋ(t) = Ax(t)+ ∑
i∈N
Biui(t), x(0) = x0. (28)
We define the following spaces:




′(t)u(t)dt < ∞}, i.e., the set of locally square-integrable functions.
b) L+2,s(x0;x,A) :=
{
u ∈ LN2,loc| s.t limt→∞ x(t) = 0, ẋ(t) = Ax(t)+Bu(t), x(0) = x0
}
.
It can be proved, for instance see lemma 2.1 [9], that the control spaces mentioned above are convex. We take LN2,loc as
the choice of control space U unless otherwise specified. In the following corollary we give conditions under which
assumption 1 is satisfied.
Lemma 5.1. For (PLQ), if the pair (A,B) is controllable then assumption 1 holds true.
Proof. If u∗ is Pareto optimal then by proposition 3.1 u∗ is optimal for the PLQi , i ∈ N. The necessary conditions for







+B′λ (t) = 0. If
−→
λ i = 0, then conditions lead to λ̇i(t) = −A′λi(t), γ̇i(t) = 0 and the
above first order condition would be B′λi(t) = 0. This implies B′λ̇i(t) = −B′A′λi(t) = 0. Repeating the same n− 1
times we see that λ ′(t)
[
B AB A2B · · · An−1B
]
= 0. As, (A,B) is controllable we necessarily have λi(t) = 0 for
all t. Further as γ̇i(t) = 0 and limt→∞ γi(t) = 0 we have γi(t) = 0 for all t. But this violates the necessary condition
(21a). So,
−→
λ i ∈ RN+\{0} and assumption 1 holds true.
Remark 6. Specializing corollary 3.2 to the linear quadratic case to guarantee assumption 1 may require restrictions
on the system parameters and control space U 4.
In the next theorem we specialize theorem 3.3 for the linear quadratic case. Towards that end, we define z(t) =
e−ρt/2x(t), v(t) = e−ρt/2u(t), p(t) = eρt/2λ (t) and Ã = A− ρ2 I.
Theorem 5.1. Let (A,B) is controllable. If (J1(x0,u∗), · · · ,JN(x0,u∗)) is a Pareto solution for the problem (27,28)



















4 A sufficient condition to satisfy assumption 1 can be shown as (A, B) controllable, A is stable and u(t) ∈ E ⊂Rm, with E being a bounded set.
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ẋ∗(t) = Ax∗(t)+Bu∗(t), x∗(0) = x0, (29b)
λ̇ (t) =−A′λ (t)− e−ρt (2Qα x∗(t)+2Sα u∗(t)) , λ (0) = l0 ∈ Rn (29c)
In case α is such that Rα > 0, the above equations can be equivalently rephrased as that every Pareto optimal
control satisfies u∗(t) = eρt/2v∗(t) where v∗(t) = −R−1α (Sα z∗(t)+B′p(t)). (z∗(t), p(t)) is the solution of the linear









, z(0) = x0 (given), p(0) = l0 ∈ Rn. (30)
Proof. (PLQ) is a special case of (Pρ ). Again using proposition 3.1 we have u∗ is optimal for PLQi , i ∈ N. Since
(A,B) is controllable from lemma 5.1 assumption 1 holds true, i.e.,
−→
λ i0 ∈RN+\{0}, i ∈ N. So, the necessary conditions
(29a-29c) follow directly from theorem 3.3.
Remark 7. Here, Gα is a Hamiltonian matrix given by
Gα :=
(
Ã−BR−1α Sα −BR−1α B′
−
(






The extremal trajectories generated by the Hamiltonian flow (30) depend on x0 and α . The additional information
that we have is p(0) = l0 ∈ Rn is bounded. The eigenvalues of the Hamiltonian matrix Gα are symmetric w.r.t real
and imaginary axis. So, Gα has at most n eigenvalues with negative real part. Bounded trajectories of (30) evolve
on the stable manifolds and converge towards the equilibrium points of (30). The state of the Hamiltonian system,[
z′(t) p′(t)
]′, has 2n variables and out of which only n, related to x0, are free. The co-state variable p(t) can be
obtained as a result of the above boundedness restriction and as a result depends on the initial state x0. In nonlinear
models, it is very common to have multiple co-state trajectories, converging to the equilibrium point, resulting in the
same optimal cost, see [11, chapter 5].
To restrict the number of possible extremal trajectories we make the following assumption on admissible controls.
Assumption 4. The set of admissible controls v ∈ L+2,s(x0,z, Ã) where
L+2,s(x0;z, Ã) :=
{
v ∈ LN2,loc | s.t limt→∞ z(t) = 0, ż(t) = Ãz(t)+Bv(t), z(0) = x0
}
.
Notice, assumption 4 requires limt→∞ z(t) = 0 whereas x(t) = eρt/2z(t) can grow unbounded. Strong restrictions on
the system parameters ensure limt→∞ x(t) = 0 , see section 5 [5] for more details. Theorem 5.1 only gives necessary
conditions and solving these equations we obtain Pareto candidates. Further, we notice that these necessary conditions
are similar, with controllability assumption, to necessary conditions for optimality of a weighted sum optimal control
problem. The following theorem relates Pareto optimality with weighted sum minimization. We first define the















β ∈PN , Ri > 0, i ∈ N and x(t) solves
ẋ(t) = Ax(t)+Bu(t), x(0) = x0. (31)
Theorem 5.2. Let (A,B) be controllable. If u∗ is Pareto optimal then there exists a
−→
β ∈PN such that the following
condition holds true
Jβ (x0,u)− Jβ (x0,u∗)+ limt→∞ λ
′(t)(x(t)− x∗(t)) = Jβ (0,u−u∗). (32)
Proof. First we notice,



























































We recognize the first part of the sum on the righthand side of the above equations as Jβ (0,u−u∗). Since u∗ is Pareto
optimal from theorem 5.1 there exists a
−→
β ∈PN such that (29a-29c) hold true. Now, we observe using conditions






























Since λ (0) is bounded, the second term in sum on the lefthand side of the above equation vanishes and results in
equation (32).
Theorem 5.3 given below states that, under controllability condition, for a fixed initial state a weighted sum (single
player) linear quadratic optimal control problem has a solution if and only if the cost function is convex in u, the
necessary conditions resulting from the maximum principle and a transversality condition are satisfied.
Theorem 5.3. We have the following assertions for Jβ (x0,v).
a) (Convexity) For any α ∈ [0,1], ui ∈U , i = 1,2 and
−→
β ∈PN we have
αJβ (x0,u1)+(1−α)Jβ (x0,u2)− Jβ (z0,αu1 +(1−α)u2) = α(1−α)Jβ (0,u1−u2). (33)
b) Let (A,B) be controllable, then u∗ = argminu∈U Jβ (x0,u) exists if
i) minu∈U Jβ (0,u) exists (and equals zero).







+B′λ (t) = 0, where (34a)
ẋ∗(t) = Ax∗(t)+Bu∗(t), x∗(0) = x0, (34b)






, λ (0) = l0 ∈ Rn. (34c)
Conversely, if (i), (ii) and in addition liminft→∞ λ ′(t)(x∗(t)− x(t))≥ 0 holds true then u∗ = argminu∈U Jβ (x0,u).
Proof. a) By linearity of the system (31) if xi(t) is generated by ui(t) with xi(0) = x0 for i = 1,2. Then for α ∈ [0,1],















































Again using the linearity property we identify the integral on the right hand side as Jβ (0,u1−u2).
b) ⇒ First, we have x(t,x0,u) = eAtx0+
∫ t
0 e

































So, if J(0,u)< 0 for some u ∈U , J(z0,τu) can be made arbitrarily small by choosing τ large enough. Therefore we
conclude that if minu∈U J(z0,u) exists, necessarily J(0,u) ≥ 0 for every u ∈ U . Since J(0,0) = 0 it is obvious that
condition (i) holds. Since u∗ is a minimizer the necessary conditions for optimality hold in normal form following the
reasoning given by lemma 5.1, and (ii) holds true.
⇐ If there exists a u∗ satisfying (34) then following the proof of theorem 5.2 we have Jβ (x0,u)− Jβ (x0,u∗) +
limt→∞ λ ′(t)(x(t)− x∗(t))= Jβ (0,u−u∗) for all u∈U . From (i) we have Jβ (x0,u)−Jβ (x0,u∗)≥ limt→∞ λ ′(t)(x∗(t)− x(t)).
By assumption, we have liminft→∞ λ ′(t)(x∗(t)− x(t))≥ 0. So, Jβ (x0,u)≥ Jβ (x0,u∗) for all u ∈U .
5.1 Fixed Initial State
In this section we give additional properties of Pareto solutions that arise due to linear quadratic nature of the game
(PLQ). First, the following properties hold true due to the linearity of the game (PLQ), refer lemma 3.2 [9] for a detailed
proof.
Lemma 5.2. Assume u∗ is a Pareto optimal control for (27, 28). Then µu∗ is a Pareto optimal control for (27, 28)
with x(0) = µx0.
As a result of the above lemma, if for the initial state x0 = 0 there exists a Pareto solution different from zero, then all
points on the half-line connecting this point and zero are also Pareto solutions. We state this observation formally in
the next corollary.
Corollary 5.1. Consider the cooperative game (27, 28) with x0 = 0. Assume u∗ is a Pareto optimal control for this
game yielding the Pareto solution J∗. Then for all µ ∈ R, µu∗ yields the Pareto solution µ2J∗.
For the two player case in a finite horizon setting theorem 3.6 [9] shows that all Pareto solutions can be obtained using
the weighting method using a technical lemma 3.5 [9]. The following theorem is an infinite horizon counter part of
theorem 3.6 [9].
Theorem 5.4. Let (A,B) be controllable. Consider the two-player case of the problem with Ri > 0.
1. If (J1(x0,u∗),J2(x0,u∗)) is a Pareto solution for problem (PLQ), then there exists an α ∈ [0,1] such that
(i) (34) hold (with u∗ defined correspondingly) and
(ii) for this α , infu Jα(0,u) := infu (αJ1(0,u)+(1−α)J2(0,u)) exists.
2. Conversely, if there exists an α ∈ (0,1) such that (i) and (ii) above hold true, then (J1(x0,u∗),J2(x0,u∗)) is a
Pareto solution.
Proof. 1) Following lemma 3.5 [9] and theorem 3.6, item (1) [9] if (J1(x0,u∗),J2(x0,u∗)) is a Pareto solution then u∗
minimizes the weighted sum Jα(x0,u). The remaining part follows from theorem 5.3 (b). 2) Follows from theorem
5.3 (b) and direct application of lemma 2.1.
Remark 8. Note that theorem 5.4 does not assume that the cost functions Ji are convex. Further, almost all Pareto
solutions can be obtained using the weighting method. The only additional Pareto optimal solutions that may exist are
obtained by considering strategies ũ = argminu∈U Ji(x0,u) for some i ∈ N. It is still unclear if the same conclusion
can be derived in a N(> 2) player setting.
5.2 Arbitrary Initial State
In this section we consider conditions under which (PLQ) has a Pareto solution for an arbitrary initial state. It is well






+Qα = 0 (ARE).
Using theorem 5 [28] and theorem 13.9 [30], we state the following proposition:
Proposition 5.1. Let (Ã,B) be controllable. Then the following are equivalent.
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a) The frequency domain inequality (FDI) satisfies
Ψα( jω) =
[







≥ εB′(− jω− Ã′)−1( jω− Ã)−1B
for some ε > 0 and 0≤ ω ≤ ∞.
b) The (ARE) has a unique real symmetric stabilizing solution Xα such that σ(Ã−BR−1α (B′Xα +Sα)) ∈ C−.
c) The Hamiltonian matrix Gα has no jω−axis eigenvalues and there exists an n dimensional stable graph sub-
space5.
Lemma 5.3. Let (Ã,B) be controllable. If the (ARE) has a real symmetric stabilizing solution for −→α 1, · · · ,−→α k ∈PN
then (ARE) has a solution for all −→α in the cone K (−→α 1,−→α 2, · · · ,−→α k), where








α i, κi > 0, i = 1,2, · · · ,k
}
.
Proof. From proposition 5.1(b), if the (ARE) has a solution for−→α i ∈PN then Ψαi( jω) satisfies the inequality given in
5.1(a) for i= 1,2, · · · ,k. So, for any−→α ∈K (−→α 1,−→α 2, · · · ,−→α k), Ψα( jω) =∑ki=1 κiΨαi( jω)≥ εB′(− jω− Ã′)−1( jω−
Ã)−1B for some ε > 0 and 0≤w≤∞. Again from proposition 5.1 we have that (ARE) with−→α ∈K (−→α 1,−→α 2, · · · ,−→α k)
has a real symmetric stabilizing solution.
In the theorem 5.5 given below we consider the special case when (ARE) has a stabilizing solution for the vertices of
the simplex PN .
Theorem 5.5. Let (Ã,B) be stabilizable and v ∈ L+2,s(x0,z, Ã). Assume (ARE) has a solution for
−→
α = −→e i, i =
1,2, · · · ,N, where −→e i is the ith standard unit vector in RN . Then for all initial states a Pareto solution exists. For












z∗(t), z∗(0) = x0.
Proof. If −→α =−→e i then the game problem reduces to a single player optimal control problem. Recalling theorem 2.7
[9], if (Ã,B) is stabilizable then minu∈U Ji(x0,u) exists if and only if (ARE) has a unique stabilizing real symmetric
solution X . Under this condition minu∈U Ji(x0,u) = x′0Xix0 is attained uniquely by u
∗(t) =−eρt/2R−1i (B′Xi +Vi)z∗(t),




z∗(t). Clearly, we have Ji(0,u)≥minu Ji(0,u)= 0. So, from theorem
5.3, Ji(x0,u) is strictly convex in u. As a result if (ARE) has a real symmetric stabilizing solution for
−→
α = −→e i,
i = 1,2, · · · ,N then players’ objectives Ji(x0,u) are strictly convex in u. Since the choice of control space is convex,
from theorem 4.1 it follows that for all Pareto optimal u∗ there exist−→α ∈PN such that u∗ := argminu∈U ∑Ni αiJi(x0,u)
for all x0. Notice, we only require that (Ã,B) to be stabilizable for this conclusion. Further, there exists a one-one
correspondence between Pareto surface and PN .
In the following lemma we show under certain conditions that a Pareto optimal control minimizes a weighted sum
optimal control problem.
Lemma 5.4. Let (Ã,B) be controllable and v ∈ L+2,s(x0,z, Ã). If u∗ is Pareto optimal then there exists a
−→
β ∈PN such




Proof. If u∗ is Pareto optimal then from theorem 5.2 there exists a
−→
β ∈PN such that (32) holds true. Suppose if
(ARE) has a unique real symmetric stabilizing solution Xβ then Jβ (x0,u) is strictly convex, and as a result there exists
a unique ũ = argminu∈U Jβ (x0,u) such that J(x0, ũ) = x′0Xβ x0, in particular minu∈U Jβ (0,u) = 0. To show u
∗ = ũ we
proceed as follows. From (32) and above arguments we have Jβ (x0,u)−Jβ (x0,u∗)+ limt→∞ λ ′(x(t)−x∗(t))≥ 0. With






, associated with stable eigen values. If X1n×n is invertible then
we call S a stable graph subspace.
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straightforward calculations we can show that lim→∞ p′(t)(z∗(t)−z(t))= lim→∞ λ ′(t)(x∗(t)−x(t)). From, proposition
5.1 we have that Gβ has an n dimensional stable graph subspace. So, the optimal co-state rule is given uniquely by
p(t) = Xβ z∗(t). As Xβ is stabilizing and v ∈ L+2,s(x0,z, Ã), we have that limt→∞(z(t)− z∗(t)) = 0, and as a result
limt→∞ p′(t)(z(t)− z∗(t)) = 0 . Clearly, Jβ (x0,u)−Jβ (x0,u∗)≥ 0 for all x0. So, u∗ also minimizes Jβ (x0,u). From the
uniqueness of the minimizer we have u∗ = ũ.
A question which next naturally arises is whether we can characterize all Pareto solutions in a way similar to theorem
5.5 if there exists some player who can obtain arbitrarily low costs if he is allowed to manipulate all control instruments
that affect the system, that is, if not all cost functions are convex. Such situations occur if, say player 1 could, by
choosing the actions of player 2, achieve arbitrarily low costs (i.e., gains). This occurs at the expense of player 2,
whose costs increase using the corresponding control scheme. We use lemma 5.3 and lemma 5.4 to address this issue
in the following corollary.
Corollary 5.2. Let (A,B) be controllable and v ∈ L+2,s(x0,z, Ã). Consider the problem with Ri > 0. Assume (ARE)
has a solution for −→α i ∈PN , i = 1,2, · · · ,k. Then for all initial states a Pareto solution exists. For a fixed initial
state and for all−→α ∈K (−→α 1,−→α 2, · · · ,−→α k), {(J1(u∗α), · · · ,JN(u∗α))} yield Pareto solutions. Here u∗α(t) := e−ρt/2v∗(t),




z∗(t), z∗(0) = x0
and Xα solves (ARE).
The number of extremal trajectories are considerably reduced by assumption 4. The co-state rule which defines the
co-state trajectory, in general, depends on the initial state. However, if (ARE) has a unique stabilizing solution it is
defined by p(t) = Xα z∗(t) and doesnot depend on the choice of the initial state. The following example demonstrates
these subtleties.


















dt, i = 1,2
sub. to ẋ(t) = (A+
ρ
2
I)x(t)+B1u1(t)+B2u2(t), x(0) = x0 6= 0, ρ > 0
v(t) = eρt/2v(t), v ∈ L+2,s(x0,z, Ã)
Here we take A = diag(a1,a2), [B1 B2] = I. Choosing ri j > 0, qi2 > 0, i, j = 1,2, q11 =−a21r11 and q21 =−a21r21 we






eigenvector and generalized eigenvector corresponding to eigenvalue zero are v10 =
[




1/a1 0 0 0
]′. The eigenvector corresponding to the stable eigenvalue −s is calculated as v1−s =[
0 s−a2aq12+(1−a)q22 0 1
]′
. The admissible extremal trajectories could belong to one of the subspaces, namely sp{v10},
sp{v10, v20}, sp{v1−s} and sp{v1−s, v10}. Taking assumption 4 some trajectories can be ruled out.
(z∗(t), p(t)) ∈ sp{v10}: In this case the we obtain v∗1(t) = −a1z∗1(t), v∗2(t) = 0, z∗1(t) = x1(0), z∗2(t) = ea2tx2(0) = 0,
p1(t) =−a1(αr11 +(1−α)r12)z∗1(t) and p2(t) = 0 for all t.
(z∗(t), p(t)) ∈ sp{v10, v20}: In this case the we obtain, in addition to the above extremal, v∗1(t) = 0, v∗2(t) = 0, z∗1(t) =
ea1tx1(0), z∗2(t) = e
a2tx2(0) = 0, p1(t) = 0 and p2(t) = 0 for all t.






x(0), z∗2(t) = e
−stx2(0), p1(t) = a1(αr11 +(1−α)r12)z∗1(t) and p2(t) =
(s−a2)
αq12+(1−α)q22
z∗2(t) for all t.








−stx2(0), p1(t) = 0 and p2(t) =
(s−a2)
αq12+(1−α)q22
z∗2(t) for all t.
Since v ∈ L+2,s(x0,z, Ã), admissible extremals satisfy limt→∞ z∗(t) = 0. In the first two cases the obtained extremal
trajectories are possible only with x0 = 0. In the latter two cases we see that the obtained extremals are possible with
x0 = (0,x2(0)) where x2(0) is arbitrary. Further, these extremals are the same. Now we check if this extremal is Pareto
optimal using the sufficient conditions given by theorem 4.2. The minimized Hamiltonian is given by H0(.) := 0.
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Since admissibility requires limt→∞ z(t) = 0 we see that limt→∞ p′(t)(z∗(t)− z(t)) = 0. So, the obtained controls are
indeed Pareto optimal. Further, we see that not all initial states, in particular x1(0) 6= 0, result in a Pareto solution.
5.3 The scalar case
In this subsection we discuss the scalar case in more detail. Notice, assuming bi 6= 0, i = 1,2, · · · ,N, controllability
is trivially satisfied. Using lemma 5.2 some interesting observations can be derived for the scalar case. The choice
of control space is taken as L+2,s(x0,z, Ã). So, all the admissible trajectories satisfy limt→∞ z(t) = 0. The Hamiltonian





, with f > 0. Now, we have the following 3 possible cases.
a) Gα has eigenvalue zero with geometric multiplicity 2. Straightforward calculations show that z(t) = x0+(ex0−
f l0)t and p(t) = l0− (gx0−el0)t. For admissibility of extremal trajectories we require limt→∞ z(t) = 0, and this
is possible only if x0 = 0 and l0 = 0 as f 6= 0.
b) Gα has complex eigenvalues. Again, straight forward calculations show that z(t)= x0 cos(wt)+(ex0− f l0)sin(wt)
and p(t) = l0 cos(wt)− (gx0 + el0)sin(wt). Following the same reasoning as above we have that x0 = 0 and
l0 = 0.
c) The eigenvector corresponding to stable eigenvalue is always a graph subspace. If σ > 0 is an eigenvalue of Gα
then −σ is also an eigenvalue of Gα . As f > 0, the eigenvector corresponding to −σ can always be taken as[
1 (e+σ)/ f
]′.
Theorem 5.6 below states that if (PLQ) has a Pareto solution for a non zero initial state, then it can be found using the
weighting method.
Lemma 5.5. Consider the scalar system with Ri > 0, i ∈ N and v ∈ L+2,s(x0,z, Ã). Let x0 6= 0. If (PLQ) has a Pareto
optimal control ũ∗(x0) then there exists an
−→
α ∈PN such that min∑i∈N αiJi subject to (28) has a solution for all initial
states (including x0 = 0).
Proof. Let (J1(x0,u∗),J2(x0,u∗), · · · ,JN(x0,u∗)) is a Pareto solution for some x0 6= 0. Since x0 is a scalar, from lemma
5.2 the scalar game (PLQ) has a Pareto solution for every initial state. Let x0 6= 0 be fixed. Let α , z∗(t) and p(t), with
a corresponding solution v∗(x0), solve (30). Due to linearity we see that for the same choice of α , µx0, µz∗(t) and
µ p(t) also solves (30). This means (30) has a solution for all x0. Since, v ∈ L+2,s(x0,z, Ã) we have limt→∞ z(t) = 0
for all x0. Following the discussion above Gα must have an eigenvalue with negative real part. Which means Gα has
no eigenvalues on the imaginary axis and there exists a stable graph subspace. So, the (ARE) has a real stabilizing
solution from proposition 5.1. Again from lemma 5.4 this means that u∗ minimizes the weighted sum objective with
α as the weight vector for all initial states x0.
Remark 9. a) As already noticed in the proof of lemma 5.5 it follows directly from lemma 5.2 that, in case the
scalar game has a Pareto solution for some initial state different from zero, the game (27, 28) has a Pareto
solution for every initial state.
b) From the proof of lemma 5.5 we can in fact conclude the following result. If for x0 6= 0 there exists a Pareto
solution and (30) has a solution with the choice of
−→̄
α =(ᾱ1, · · · , ᾱN)∈PN , then the scalar optimization problem
min∑i∈N ᾱiJi subject to (28) has a solution for all initial states x0 ∈ R. In other words all candidates obtained
from theorem 5.1 are indeed Pareto solutions.
Theorem 5.6. Consider the scalar system with Ri > 0, i ∈ N and v ∈ L+2,s(x0,z, Ã). Then for some x0 6= 0/every x0
(27, 28) has a Pareto optimal control ũ∗(x0) if and only if there exists
−→
α ∈PN such that for every x0 min∑i∈N αiJi
subject to (28) has a solution.
Proof. ⇒ In particular, it follows that if (27, 28) has a Pareto optimal solution for some x0 6= 0 then lemma 5.5 yields
the advertized result.
⇐ Since Rα > 0, if there exists an −→α ∈PN such that for every x0 min∑i∈N αiJi has a solution then the associated
(ARE) has a stabilizing solution. The control strategy thus obtained is unique. Further, this control is indeed Pareto
optimal from theorem 5.1.
In other words, theorem 5.6 shows that to find all Pareto solutions of the game (27, 28), with arbitrary initial state
(or for some initial state different from zero) one has to determine all −→α ∈PN for which (ARE) has a stabilizing
solution. From remark 9.b and theorem 5.6 we have the following algorithm to find all the Pareto solutions for a scalar
game.
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∣∣(ARE) has a stabilizing solution Xα} .
1. To find all Pareto solutions of the game (27, 28) with arbitrary initial state one has to determine the set I(α).









α ∈ I(α), (35)
where Kα solves the corresponding (ARE).
2. To find all Pareto solutions for which the game (27, 28) has a Pareto solution for a fixed initial state x0 6= 0 use
step (1).
3. If x0 = 0 and I(α) is non empty, u∗ ≡ 0 is a Pareto optimal control. We know from corollary 5.1 that if we find
a Pareto solution different from zero, then all points on the half-line through this solution and zero are Pareto
solutions too.
We consider example 6.2 from [7] to illustrate the usage of algorithm 1.
Example 6. Consider the situation in which there are two individuals who invest in a public stock of knowledge. Let
x(t) be the stock of knowledge at time t and ui(t) the investment of player i in public knowledge at time t. Assume
that the stock of knowledge evolves according to the accumulation equation
ẋ(t) =−βx(t)+u1(t)+u2(t), x(0) = x0,
where β is the depreciation rate. Assume that each player derives quadratic utility from the consumption of the stock
of knowledge and that the cost of investment increases quadratically with the investment effort. That is, the cost










Since the investment efforts are bounded and the system is controllable all Pareto solutions can be obtained using the














For the choice of model parameters β = 2, θ = 0.05, ri = qi = 1, i = 1,2 the above condition is written as α(1−α)>
0.2380,0 < α < 1. Applying the algorithm (1) we find I(α) = (0.3902, 0.6098) and all Pareto efficient controls are
given by (35).
Next, we consider an example to illustrate that in general the set of Pareto optimal control actions is not convex.




































(u1 +u2) , x(0) = x0 6= 0, ρ > 0.
Here player i controls ui. Using the algorithm 1 the game has a Pareto optimal solution for those α ∈ [0, 1] for which
the (ARE) −sx2α +1 = 0, where s = 16(9α−8)(8α+1) . Taking xα =
√
s here, we see that for all α ∈ [0,1] there is a Pareto



















∗(0) = x0 6= 0
For α = 14 and α =
3

























(t) With straight forward calculations it can be
verified that this choice of control yields the same cost, J̃ = 1.2548, i = 1,2, for both players. On the other hand choos-




yields a lower cost, same for both the players, J∗1
2
= 1.25< 1.2548= J̃.




In this paper we derived necessary conditions for the existence of Pareto solutions in an infinite horizon cooperative
differential game with open loop information structure. We considered non-autonomous and discounted autonomous
systems for the analysis. These conditions are in the spirit of the maximum principle. For autonomous systems we
derived some necessary conditions for optimality by exploiting the special constraint structure (due to reformulation of
Pareto optimality). We gave some weak conditions, related to the extension of finite horizon transversality conditions,
under which the necessary conditions for Pareto optimality are same as those of a weighted sum optimal control
problem. Furthermore, we derived conditions under which the necessary conditions are also sufficient.
Later, the obtained results are used to analyze the regular indefinite infinite horizon linear quadratic differential
game. We showed that if the dynamic system is controllable then all Pareto candidates can be obtained by solving the
necessary conditions for optimality of a weighted sum optimal control problem. For the two player case we showed
that almost all Pareto solutions can be obtained by using the weighting method even if player’s cost functions are not
convex. For the N player scalar case we presented an algorithm to calculate all the Pareto solutions if the initial state
differs from zero. This algorithm proceeds by determining the elements in the unit simplex for which the associated
weighted algebraic Riccati equation has a solution. We illustrated the subtleties with relevant examples.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.1. We prove the lemma using a contradiction argument. Suppose (x∗(t), t,u∗(t),1), t ∈ [0, T ] is not









h j(ẑ(T )−T )+
∫ T
0




e−ρtg j(x∗(t),u∗(t))dt, ∀ j ∈ N\{i}.
Since v̂(t) ∈ [1/2, ∞), ẑ(t) is an increasing function defined on [0, T ] so by the inverse function theorem ẑ(t) is
invertible on [0, ẑ(T )]. We define x̂(s) = Ŷ (ẑ−1(s)) and û(s) = Û(ẑ−1(s)) for s ∈ [0, ẑ(T )] and observe that x̂(0) =
Ŷ (ẑ−1(0)) = x0 and x̂(z(T )) = Ŷ (ẑ−1(ẑ(T ))) = Ŷ (T ) = x∗(T ). Further, we have x̂(s) defined on s ∈ [0, ẑ(T )] as:
x̂(z(t)) = x0 +
∫ t
0
˙̂Y (t)dt = x0 +
∫ T
0
v̂(t) f (Y (t),U(t))dt.
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Taking s = z(t) we have
x̂(s) = x0 +
∫ s
0




for s ∈ [0, ẑ(T )]. Since x̂(s) satisfies the above integral equation we have ˙̂x(s) = f (x̂(s), û(s)), x̂(0) = x0, s ∈ [0, ẑ(T )].
Next, for s > ẑ(T ), we define x̂(s) = x∗(s− ẑ(T )+ T ) and û(s) = u∗(s− ẑ(T )+ T ). Then we observe that ẋ(s) =




is admissible for problem (Pρi ) and satisfies














e−ρtg j(x∗(t),u∗(t))dt, ∀ j ∈ N\{i},
which clearly violates the optimality of (x∗(t),u∗(t)) for the problem (Pρi ).
Proof of Theorem 3.2. (PρiT ) is a mixed endpoint constrained finite horizon optimal control problem. We first define
the Hamiltonian HiT
(−→
λ iT ,z(t),Y (t),v(t),U(t)
)
as:
HiT (.) = v(t)e
−ρz(t)




jT (t)g j(Y (t),U(t))
+ v(t)λ ′i (t) f (Y (t),U(t))+ v(t)γi(t). (36)
The necessary conditions are: there exist λ 0iT ∈ R+, µ
i
jT (t) ∈ R, λiT (t) ∈ R
n, γiT (t) ∈ R such that for almost every t ∈
[0,T ] (the partial derivatives of the Hamiltonian given below are evaluated at the optimal pair ((x∗(t), t),(u∗(t),1))):
λ̇iT (t) = −(HiT )Y










∗(t),u∗(t)), λiT (T ) free
µ̇
i
jT (t) = −(HiT )Ỹ ij , µ
i




x̃ j(T )+h j(0)− x̃∗j
)
= 0, ∀ j ∈ N\{i}









jT (t), j ∈ N\{i}},λiT (t),γiT (t)
)
6= (0, · · · ,0) .
Since (HiT )x̃ij = 0, we have µ
i
jT (t) = µ
i
















λ iT ∈ RN+. Next we show by contradiction that also from the necessary conditions
(−→
λ iT ,λiT (0)
)
6= (0,0). For, if(−→
λ iT ,λiT (0)
)
= (0,0) then the necessary conditions give that




which results in λiT (t) = 0 for t ∈ [0,T ]. Further,
−→
λ iT = 0 leads to γiT (t) = 0 for t ∈ [0,T ] which violates the necessary
condition
(−→
λ iT ,λiT (t),γiT (t)
)
6= (0,0,0) for all 0≤ t ≤ T . Since λiT (T ) is free, we choose (without loss of generality)
λiT (0) such that
∥∥∥(−→λ iT ,λiT (0))∥∥∥= 1. The adjoint variable λiT (t) satisfies:







∗(t),u(t)), λiT (0) = l
0
iT , (37)
whereas γiT (t) satisfies




From the definition of h(.) we have:
























The Hamiltonian is linear in v(t) and the minimum w.r.t (U(t),v(t)) on the set U × [1/2, ∞) is attained at (u∗(t),1).




∗(t),u∗(t))+λ ′iT (t) f (x
∗(t),u∗(t))+ γiT (t) = 0, ∀t ∈ [0,T ]. (40)
The minimum of the Hamiltonian w.r.t U(t) is independent of v(t) (positive scaling) and does not depend on the term





λ iT , t,x







∗(t),u(t))+λ ′iT (t) f (x
∗(t),u(t))
)
, ∀t ∈ [0,T ]. (41)
Now, consider an increasing sequence {Tk}k∈N such that limk→∞ Tk = ∞. We can associate an optimal control problem








∥∥∥(−→λ iTk , l0iTk)∥∥∥ = 1. We know from the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem that
every bounded sequence has a convergent subsequence. Using the same indices for such a subsequence we infer that
there exists
−→







λ i ∈ RN+ and limk→∞ l
0
iTk
= l0i such that
∥∥∥(−→λ i, l0i )∥∥∥= 1. (42)
We observe that (37) is a linear ODE. So we can write λiTk (t) as:
λiTk











where Φ− f ′x(t,s) is the state transition matrix associated with ż(t) =− f
′
x(x
∗(t),u∗(t)) z(t). Since the weights of
−→
λ iTk
appear linearly in Gx(.) as k→ ∞, λi(t) satisfies the differential equation (21b). A similar argument holds for γiTk (t),
condition (40) and (41) resulting in (21c), (21e) and (21d) respectively.
Proof of Corollary 3.2. From the necessary conditions (21d) and (21e) of theorem 3.2 we have
e−ρtG(
−→
λ i,x∗(t),u(t))+λ ′i (t) f (x
∗(t),u(t))≥ e−ρtG(
−→
λ i,x∗(t),u∗(t))+λ ′i (t) f (x
∗(t),u∗(t)) =−γi(t). (44)
By assumption 2 we have λ ′i (t) f (x




. Since ||q(t)|| ≤ 1 we have limsup
t→∞
||q(t)||= l.
If l = 0 there is nothing to prove. So assume l > 0 and consider a sequence {tn} converging to infinity such that
||q(tn)|| > l/2. Since there exists u(t) ∈U such that Bδ>06 ⊂ f (x∗(t),u(t)), there exists an ε > 0 such that 2εl < δ .
So, there exists un(tn) ∈ U such that f (x∗(tn),un(tn)) = −(2ε/l)q(tn). Since, limt→∞ γi(t) = 0 we take the above
sequence {tn} such that −lε/2≤−γ(tn)≤ lε/2. Collecting all the above we have:
λ
′
i (tn) f (x
∗(tn),un(tn)) =−max{1, ||λi(tn)||}(2ε/l) ||q(tn)||2 ≥−γi(tn)
γi(tn)≥max{1, ||λi(tn)||}(2ε/l) ||q(tn)||2 > lε/2.
Clearly, this is a contradiction and thus limt→∞ λi(t) = 0.
Proof of Corollary 3.3. From the assumption 3 there exist constants c4 ≥ 0, c5 ≥ 0, c6 ≥ 0 and c7 ≥ 0 such that:




≤ c6e−ρt + c7e−(ρ−(r+1)λ )t .
6Unit ball in Rnof radius δ > 0.
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Since ρ > (1+ r)λ , the player’s costs Ji(u) converge for every admissible pair (x(t),u(t)). For the problem (Pi) we
rewrite λi(t) (from (21b)) as follows:





e−ρsΦ− f ′x(t,s) Gx(x
∗(s),u∗(s))ds


























The norm of λi(t) is bounded as:
||λi(t)|| ≤
∥∥Φ− f ′x(t,0)∥∥(||l0i ||+∫ t0 e−ρs∥∥Φ fx(s,0)∥∥‖Gx(x∗(s),u∗(s))‖ds
)
(from (3b) there exist a c8 ≥ 0, a c9 ≥ 0 such that)
≤
∥∥Φ− f ′x(t,0)∥∥(||l0i ||+∫ t0 e−ρs
(




(l0i is bounded, so there exist a c10 ≥ 0, a c11 ≥ 0 and c12 ≥ 0) such that
≤
∥∥Φ− f ′x(t,0)∥∥(c10 + c11e−(ρ−λ )t + c12e−(ρ−(1+r)λ )t) .
Let φ 0(t) and φ0(t) denote the largest and smallest eigenvalues of the Hermitian part7 of− f ′x(x∗(t),u∗(t)). By assump-
tion − f ′x(x∗(t),u∗(t)) is bounded and has strictly negative eigenvalues so we have −∞ < φ0(t) ≤ φ 0(t) < 0, ∀t ≥ 0.







∥∥Φ− f ′x(t,0)∥∥≤ exp(∫ T0 µ0(s)ds
)
.
Since µ0(s) < 0 for all s ≥ 0 we have limt→∞
∥∥Φ− f ′x(t,0)∥∥ = 0. By assumption ρ > (1+ r)λ so limt→∞ λi(t) = 0
follows directly.
7The Hermitian part of matrix A is defined here as AH = 12 (A+A
′).
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